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"I'd tell you everything if you'd pick up that telephone": 
political expression and data protection 
 
Daithí Mac Síthigh* 
 
This is a preprint of an article subsequently published in the European Human Rights 
Law Review at [2011] EHRLR 166-175. 
Discusses the significance of Directive 2002/58 in terms of its effect on democratic political 
activities. Comments on the data protection framework in the UK, noting problems 
experienced by political parties attempting direct marketing by means of automated 
messaging as part of their campaigning. Looks at the scope and definition of the law, 
addressing direct marketing issues and whether there is a case for treating political 
communication differently. Examines the impact of the framework on human rights, including 
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 art.10. 
 
Introduction 
While the relationship between data protection and freedom of expression is 
proving to be of ongoing interest, particularly regarding the application of an 
‘exemption’ for purposes such as journalism,1 the focus of this article is the 
particular problem of Directive 2002/58 on privacy and electronic 
communications.2  Although the adoption and implementation of this Directive, 
which amends the European Union’s original Data Protection Directive 95/46, 
is not itself specific to political communication, considering electronic 
communication such as SMS, email and fax more broadly, it will be argued 
here that its impact on democratic political activities is significant.  The 
implementation of the Directive in the United Kingdom (and subsequent 
disputes and determinations) will be the focus, although other jurisdictions 
and EU and ECHR principles will be considered as appropriate.  The first 
section sets out the UK legal framework and reviews some recent applications 
of the law.  The second section then considers questions of scope and 
definition within the existing law, followed by a consideration of the objections 
                                                           
* UEA Law School, University of East Anglia, UK; member of media@uea. Email: d.mac-
sithigh@uea.ac.uk. Thanks to David Mead, Michael Harker (both UEA), Nick Anstead (LSE) 
and David Erdos (Oxford) for comments. 
1 The matter has been considered by the Court of Justice of the EU on a number of occasions 
over the past decade, e.g. Lindqvist [2003] C-101/01; Satakunnan Markkinapörssi [2008] C-
73/07.  Commentary includes A White, ‘Data Protection and the Media’ [2003] EHRLR 25; A 
Sharpe, ‘Data protection reaches the European Court of Justice’ (2004) 9 Communications 
Law 22; S Vousden, ‘Satamedia and the Single European Audiovisual Area’ [2009] EIPR 527;  
see further the work of the Data Protection and the Open Society (DPOS) project at the 
University of Oxford: http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/dataprotection/  
2 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector. 
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to such from a fundamental rights perspective in the third section.  The final 
section brings together these points and suggests that data protection law as 
currently applied fails to protect communication by parties and candidates, to 
the detriment of citizen participation in the political process. 
 
1. Data protection in the UK  
The transmission of ‘communications comprising recorded matter for direct 
marketing purposes by way of an automated calling system’ without the 
consent of the telephone service subscriber is prohibited under UK and EU 
data protection law.3 Where such communications are permitted, the sender 
must also provide their names as well as an address or freephone number.  
Despite these requirements, though, a number of UK political parties have 
found themselves the subject of bad publicity in the media and formal action 
by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), in particularly through 
enforcement notices issued under section 40 of the Data Protection Act 1998.  
While the rules have been clearly explained and reiterated on a number of 
occasions,4 the schadenfreude that inevitably follows the declaration that a 
group of persons seeking the power to write the law has failed to comply with 
the law masks the more serious issue that the Directive may prevent 
legitimate and beneficial political activities. 
 
In a competitive political environment, political parties continue to explore 
various methods of promotion and communication, ranging from posters to 
Twitter.5  A recent problem regarding telephone communications which came 
to come to public notice was an enforcement notice issued to the Labour 
Party on 4 February 2010.  Labour compiled a list of just under half a million 
                                                           
3 The Directive is transposed by way of SI 2426/2003, the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003. 
4 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Promotion of a Political Party’, 5 April 2005, formerly 
available (copy on file with author) at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/promoti
on_of_a_political_party.pdf  [‘Promotion of a Political Party’]; Information Commissioner’s 
Office, ‘Guidance for political parties for campaigning or promotional purposes’, 4 March 
2010, available at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/promoti
on_of_a_political_party.pdf [‘Guidance for Political Parties’].  
5 See for example P Bazalgette, ‘Politics in primetime’ (Guardian 10 May 2010), p. M1, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/may/10/television-general-election.  
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telephone numbers (purchasing most of them) and placed automatic calls 
(voiced by actress Elizabeth (Liz) Dawn6) in the days before the 2009 local 
and European elections. It was not surprising, then, that the Information 
Commissioner’s Office used its powers to issue an enforcement notice, 
having already received an undertaking from the party not to make automated 
calls after a previous incident in 2007. While doing so, the ICO reiterated its 
view on the matter in an accompanying press statement and reminded the 
public that ‘automated calls can cause annoyance and disruption which is why 
it is so important for organisations making such calls to gain the consent of 
individuals.’7  This is an interesting turn of phrase that is more explanatory or 
normative than regulatory, and a theme of the various statements issued by 
the ICO regarding these matters, although it does not reflect the full spectrum 
of reasonable views on the question of political communication. 
 
Other parties have also attempted to use automated messages during 
campaigning, drawing the consistent and critical attention of the ICO.  The 
most comprehensively argued complaint related to the Scottish National Party 
(SNP), the subject of a 2005 enforcement notice from the ICO, which was 
appealed to the then-Information Tribunal in 2006.8  In this case, a series of 
automated calls using the voice of another actor (Sean Connery) was placed 
during March and April 2005, before the UK-wide general election that took 
place in May of that year.  Like Labour, the SNP had used this method before, 
and the decision came at a time of significant speculation and discussion 
regarding telephone marketing by political parties,9 including a separate 
enforcement notice issued to the Conservative Party. Subsequently, during a 
speech at the Liberal Democrat conference in 2008, party leader Nick Clegg 
announced that he would be calling thousands of households to talk about his 
                                                           
6 Well known to many recipients through her role as Vera Duckworth on the soap Coronation 
Street between 1974 and 2008. 
7 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Labour Party found in breach of privacy rules’ (press 
release) 9 February 2010, available at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pressreleases/2010/labour_party_enforcement_noti
ce_final_090210.pdf  
8 Scottish National Party v Information Commissioner [2006] UKIT EA_2005_0021 (15 May 
2006) [SNP v IC]. For discussion, see G Brooks, ‘Information Tribunal makes cold calling 
ruling’ (2006) 11 Communications Law 211. 
9 SNP v IC [14-19] (agreed facts).   
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party’s policies.  Clegg argued that it was time for politics to ‘connect with 
people again’ and set out a number of actions, including ‘knock(ing) on a 
million doors in Britain’, speaking face-to-face to voters and ‘calling 250,000 
people to hear their views on the challenges facing our country’.10  As reported 
at the time, the calls were in fact ‘automated 30 second voice message(s) … 
with recipients tapping numbers on their handsets to respond to questions 
about education, health, tax, crime, environmental and economic policies’.11 
These calls were both unsolicited and automated, and drew quite a reaction, 
with the Daily Mail describing it in a headline as ‘pester(ing) voters …during 
TV soaps’.12 The Information Commissioner determined that the calls 
constituted direct marketing, issuing an enforcement notice to the party shortly 
afterwards.13 
 
It is already clear that the share of political budgets spent on direct forms of 
marketing (particularly the maintenance of databases and the use of direct 
mail) increased in the 2005 general election in the UK and has been the 
subject of significant planning across the political parties.14  However, the 
outcome of the legal and regulatory development discussed above is that 
major political parties across the UK have made use of various telephone 
marketing approaches, and the ICO has firmly and consistently opposed 
such.  As in the US, where the situation was described as ‘thoroughly 
nonpartisan’ in 2004,15 there is little evidence of any relationship between 
ideology and willingness to use these methods, although the various 
complaints by political parties about each other are quite bizarre, given the 
variety of cases that have arisen.  It is therefore necessary to consider, while 
                                                           
10 Speech to the Liberal Democrat Conference, 17 September 2008, available at 
http://www.libdems.org.uk/speeches_detail.aspx?title=Nick_Clegg%E2%80%99s_speech_to_
the_Liberal_Democrat_Conference&pPK=2ebf8cc7-32df-4b97-8065-1fdd33793384  
11 ‘Lib Dems told to end “robocalls”’ (BBC News 25 September 2008), available at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7635799.stm  
12 I Drury, ‘Nick Clegg to pester voters with 250,000 automated phone calls during TV soaps’ 
(Daily Mail 17 September 2008), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1056820/Nick-Clegg-pester-voters-250-000-automated-phone-calls-TV-soaps.html  
13 Enforcement notice: Liberal Democrats (24 September 2008), available at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/privacy_and_electronic/notices/lib_dem_enfor
cement_notice.pdf  
14 P Harris & A Lock, ‘Political Marketing Funding and Expenditure in the UK General Election 
Campaign of 2005’ (2005) 21 Journal of Marketing Management 1117. 
15 D McCullagh, ‘Political spam as national pastime’ (CNET News 17 May 2004), available at 
http://news.cnet.com/Political-spam-as-national-pastime/2010-1028_3-5213287.html  
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not minimising the scourge of unwanted telephone messages, the impact of 
general controls on political expression as a wider principle.  
 
2. Scope and definition 
(a) What is direct marketing? 
It has proven difficult to establish whether the key issues are of European 
Union law or of decisions made at a national level, and whether the problem 
(if there is one) is with statutory language or ICO and Information Tribunal 
decisions.  However, with a view to the evolving EU arrangements regarding 
fundamental rights, it is possible to continue this analysis based on general 
principles (primarily article 10 ECHR) while noting that the resolution of any 
fundamental rights claim might need further attention.  As the ECJ noted in 
Lindqvist, one of the few cases where the tension between data protection (in 
its general form) and freedom of expression is explored, the Directive itself 
does not (in its view) violate fundamental rights, but national application of its 
provisions must take rights including article 10 into account in a proportionate 
fashion.16  However, this approach does depend on there being a sufficient 
degree of flexibility in terms of transposition, which may not always be 
present, depending on the provision in question. 
 
There is no definition of ‘direct marketing’ in the UK statutory instrument or 
indeed in the original Directive.  However, the former refers back to the Data 
Protection Acts.  From the Act, it can be noted that direct marketing is defined 
as ‘any advertising or marketing material’ directed to an individual (section 
11(3)). The position of the Information Commissioner is that this concept 
includes political communications,17 although this point is not backed by any 
incontestable legal source, relying instead in the 2005 statement on the most 
vague of definitions and on the SNP decision in the 2010 statement.  On 
various occasions, the Commissioner has supplied three definitions of direct 
marketing that are argued to support his view.  It is worth considering them in 
turn. 
 
                                                           
16 Lindqvist [88-90]. 
17 ‘Promotion of a political party’ 7-8; ‘Guidance for political parties’ 2. 
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The first statement is taken from a 1985 Council of Europe 
recommendation,18 which includes a statement that direct marketing  
comprises all activities which make it possible to offer goods or 
services or to transmit other messages to a segment of the population 
by post, telephone or other direct means aimed at informing or 
soliciting a response from the data subject as well as any service 
ancillary thereto.   
There is absolutely no mention of non-commercial communications here.  We 
can presume (as the Information Commissioner’s statements do not explain 
which aspects of the statement point to political communication) that the 
references to transmitting ‘other messages’ aimed at ‘informing or soliciting a 
response’ include these communications.  However, this in itself is a very 
broad statement (surely all statements inform?) and does not really determine 
the matter one way or another.  
 
The second is taken from the Distance Selling Directive,19 where ‘advertising’ 
is defined as including ‘all forms of direct marketing communication, including 
any sales promotion or fund raising whether or not it contains an offer or an 
invitation to treat’.  This appears to be a less clear statement, as the only 
elaboration of direct marketing communication (itself undefined) is the 
reference to sales promotions and fund raising, neither of which are at issue 
here.  Clearly, the purpose of the definition is to ensure that advertisements 
such as sales promotions and fundraising endeavours not including invitations 
to treat do not fall outside the directive - a sensible approach. 
 
The third is the most problematic and it is questionable whether it should be 
included at all.  The Information Commissioner relies on a 1998 statement 
issued by the Federation of European Direct Marketing (FEDMA), as do 
others such as the Data Protection Commissioner in Ireland.20  The statement 
is clearly a descriptive one and the language (e.g. ‘not a homogenous 
                                                           
18 Recommendation No.R (85) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the 





20 Data Protection Commissioner (Ireland), ‘Data protection in the telecommunications area’ 
(Case study 4/02), available at https://www.dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=113 
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marketing discipline but rather a series of different strategies’) is clear 
evidence of its context as an analysis of a marketing concept of little 
relevance to the interpretation of the Data Protection Directive.  Indeed, 
although the Information Commissioner simply refers to the statement being 
‘in a paper’, it is never cited, but it may be fair to assume that the organisation 
may be inclined to take a broad approach to defining its own discipline and 
membership.  This is appropriate for FEDMA but not for a public authority, 
and the separate recognition of FEDMA’s code of conduct under article 27 of 
the Directive does not mean that an uncited definition of this nature should be 
given such force in this particular context. 
 
It can be concluded from the above that the scope of the relevant laws and 
regulations is ambiguous, and that the Information Commissioner has 
adopted the approach that favours the protection of the individual subscriber 
to a telephone service (and the right to privacy of that subscriber).  Turning to 
the EU aw a whole, the Article 29 Working Party has also attended to the 
matter, albeit without adding complete clarity.  In a 2004 Opinion, the 
provisions of recital 30 of the original Data Protection Directive21 (which is not 
referred to by the Information Commissioner) are reproduced.  This recital 
deals with the disclosure of data for marketing purposes ‘whether carried out 
commercially or by a charitable organization or by any other association or 
foundation, of a political nature for example’.  This does suggest that 
marketing can include non-commercial activities, although it should be noted 
that this is an option for Member States who can set the conditions for 
disclosure.  Nonetheless, this reference is followed by a statement that it is 
the Working Party’s opinion that article 23 of 2002/58 ‘consequently covers 
any form of sales promotion, including direct marketing by charities and 
political organisations (e.g. fund raising, etc.)’.22  The reference to fund raising 
in parentheses does seem to suggest that the broader term marketing may 
not be entirely without problem.  This is subtly but crucially different to the 
                                                           
21 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data. 




Information Commissioner, who repeatedly refers, in the case of political and 
charitable organizations, to ‘appeals for funds or support’, despite the obvious 
differences between the former and the latter, with an appeal to contribute 
finance being easier to rationalise as in the same category as appeals to 
purchase goods and services.   
 
(b) Treating political communication differently 
Is there a case for treating the (non-research-based) communication of 
political information differently to ‘ordinary’ marketing?  The system for the 
regulation of non-broadcast advertising in the UK (the self-regulatory code 
enforced by the Advertising Standards Authority does in fact draw a distinction 
between political advertising (including direct marketing) and advertising/direct 
marketing more generally. 23  The Code of Advertising Practice provides that: 
‘any advertisement or direct marketing communication, whenever published or 
distributed, whose principal function is to influence voters in local, regional, 
national or international elections or referendums’ is exempt from the said 
code. 24 This does neatly avoid the problem of having to subject political 
advertising to the traditional requirements of legality, honesty, truth and 
decency, however amusing that might be.  On the other hand, it is clear that 
political advertising (broadly defined as including both party politics and 
politically motivated advertising) is not permitted under UK broadcasting 
legislation,25 upheld by the House of Lords in 200826 but surely in question 
again since the decision of the European Court of Human Rights later that 
year in TV Vest.27  However, this view is not necessarily as fatal as it might 
seem, as it can also serve to emphasise the need to treat ‘advertising’ and 
                                                           
23 The Information Commissioner has however confirmed that genuine political research is 
different to marketing: ‘Promotion of a Political Party’ 5; ‘Guidance for Political Parties’ 4. 
24 Another example of a non-statutory distinction between political and commercial promotion 
is the guidelines surrounding ‘cold calling zones’ established by Trading Standards authorities 
in the UK in areas with high populations of elderly residents.  These zones are established to 
restrict (through the promotion of best practices and ‘naming and shaming’) the activities of 
callers selling goods or services or collecting money, with it being recommended that those 
promoting an area explicitly decide and explain whether to target political canvassing 
alongside commercial activities. Trading Standards Institute, ‘Setting up no cold calling 
zones’, available at http://www.leicester.gov.uk/business/trading-standards/no-cold-calling-
zones-faq/  
25 Communications Act 2003, ss. 319-321. 
26 R (Animal Defenders International) v SoS for Culture, Media & Sport [2008] UKHL 15 
27 TV Vest & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway (2009) 48 EHRR 51. 
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‘political advertising’ in different ways.  So is there a case for a political 
exemption to the electronic direct marketing rules? Or should the lead of the 
broadcast law be followed and unsolicited political electronic direct marketing 
ruled out entirely?  In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider 
the right to freedom of expression in more detail. 
 
3. Impact on human rights 
(a) Application of the Convention 
Of course, the future of political advertising itself in the UK remains unclear 
while the inevitable further debate (at Strasbourg)28 of the broadcast political 
advertising ban is awaited.  With this in mind, though, the position of the 
Information Commissioner is not without question.  In particular, there is 
possible value in considering the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court and of 
the UK courts on the treatment of unpopular or intrusive speech.  In Connolly 
v DPP,29 for example, the case turns in part on the level of intrusion of the 
(‘gratuitously offensive’) offensive communications through the post, despite 
the importance of the abortion issue in public debate.  In the case of political 
communications through automated calls, the level of intrusion is similar to or 
somewhat short of that in Connolly (a telephone call can be terminated before 
the substance is reached, as compared with a letter that is immediately before 
the reader’s eyes in full), and the level of offence greatly different.  The 
Malicious Communications Act at issue in Connolly and Directive 2002/58 at 
issue in this article both address (in different ways) the protection of the 
receiver of a communication, but of course the threat to individual rights of 
communications relevant to the MCA is a more serious one.  In addition, in his 
critique of the decision in Connolly, Wragg has argued that there is a need 
(not properly addressed in the decision) to consider the importance of political 
expression outside of the institutional media.30  Although Connolly’s political 
                                                           
28 See for example T Lewis, ‘Reasserting the Primacy of Broadcast Political Speech after 
Animal Defenders International? Rogaland Pensioners Party v Norway‘ (2009) 1 Journal of 
Media Law 37, 42 (‘The Court’s judgment in Pensioners Party, strongly reaffirming as it does 
its earlier approach in VgT, undermines the decision of the House of Lords in ADI, as well as 
the view of the UK government’) and 46 (‘ it would seem that [ADI] has a very strong chance 
of success’). 
29 Connolly v DPP [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin). 
30 P Wragg, ‘Free speech is not valued if only valued speech is free: Connolly, consistency 
and some Article 10 concerns’ (2009) 15 European Public Law 111, 129. 
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speech may have been at the further fringes of Convention protection, 
according to the UK courts at least, the ability to use direct forms of 
communication between campaigner and audience is certainly a part of a 
mature political debate.  Dyson LJ recognises this in Connolly, explaining the 
difference between the particular communications found to be appropriate for 
the conviction in this case and hypothetical others including the same content 
being sent to doctors and members of Parliament, and drawing a firm link 
between the protection against receipt and the offensiveness of the content.31 
 
Indeed, one disappointing aspect of the record to date is the absence of a 
thorough published analysis of the impact of the ICO’s interpretation and 
actions on the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by article 10 of 
the Convention.  The decision of the then-Information Tribunal in SNP does 
reproduce a number of excellent points made by the legal representatives of 
the parties in respect of the question of fundamental rights (including useful 
submissions on proportionality),  but it is then all the more surprising that the 
disposal of the issue is so terse.  The Tribunal simply finds that:  
The only limitation being placed on the SNP is as to the method of 
conveyance of a communication, not as to its content, and only to the 
extent that an individual or data subject had not previously consented 
or opted-in to receiving automated calls. In our view this does not 
amount to a breach of the ECHR.32 
 
It is impossible to assess the extent of the consideration of Convention rights 
from such a minimalist finding.  If the Tribunal had taken the step of setting 
out why the restriction on freedom of expression was considered to be 
necessary, based on a detailed evaluation of the submissions of the parties 
and a consideration of relevant legal principles, then the matter would be clear 
to all concerned and the interference with fundamental rights would be 
properly explained and circulated.  The Information Commissioner, too, 
frequently makes reference to ‘taking account of’ the Convention and the 
Human Rights Act’, and mentions the qualified rights under articles 8 and 10 
of the Convention.  Again, though, there is little discussion of how the 
                                                           
31 Connolly v DPP [28]. 
32 SNP v ICO [99]. 
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question of the conflict between these rights is approached, let alone 
resolved.  Nor is the link between free elections and free speech considered 
(as discussed for example in Bowman v UK33 in the context of election 
expenditure).  The reference is this little more than a pro forma statement that 
acknowledges the duty of the Commissioner, as a public authority, to act in a 
lawful manner (in accordance with the Convention rights).  Of course, 
following the decisions of the House of Lords in Begum,34 there is no duty on 
decision-makers subject to section 6 of the Human Rights Act to give specific 
consideration to the impact of decisions on the Convention rights of 
individuals.35  However, public authorities remain free to provide as much 
information as they determine appropriate in relevant decisions, so there is no 
legal obstacle to a more thorough consideration of the impact of the decisions 
discussed in this note.   
 
Given the implications of the Information Commissioner’s view, and the scope 
for criticism of the sources relied upon in forming that view, greater public 
confidence in the protection of freedom of expression would come from an 
explicit elaboration of the various relevant factors in place of a selective list of 
supportive sources and a bare acknowledgement of the existence of various 
fundamental rights.  Such an analysis might consider the development of a 
doctrine at Strasbourg regarding political expression, such as the association 
between press freedom and the wider notion of a core Europe-wide concept 
of ‘freedom of political debate’ in Lingens,36 the subsequent distinctions made 
between political and other expression (e.g. Wingrove37 regarding artistic 
expression), and the emerging recognition of the importance of sensitivity to 
protected rights where there is a mixture of ‘types’ (e.g. between 
political/general interest and commercial in VgT)38.  In all cases, the speech 
considered above would be considered more deserving of protection rather 
                                                           
33 (1998) 26 EHRR 1. 
34 R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15. 
35 See further T Poole, 'The reformation of English administrative law' (2009) 68 CLJ 142, 
154-5; compare D Mead, ‘Judicial Miss Behavin’: a defence of process-based review of public 
authority decisions under the HRA’ [2008] Norwich Law School Working Paper 08/02, 
available at http://lawwp.webapp2.uea.ac.uk/wp/index.php/workingpapers/article/view/6/7  
36 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407 [42]. 
37 Wingrove v UK (1996) 24 EHRR 1 
38 VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken (2002) 34 EHRR 4 [69-71]. 
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than less, a point which could plausibly be dealt with in measures of national 
execution through a specific mention of the need to consider freedom of 
expression.   
 
Within the UK, the relationship between freedom of expression and political 
campaigning has very recently come into focus after the decision regarding 
the electoral literature of Phil Woolas, who was found by an Electoral Court to 
have breached electoral law (and thus disqualified from sitting in Parliament).  
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, an article 10 assessment was carried out, 
and Article 3 of the First Protocol mentioned, although there was a further 
element of the protection of reputation under article 8.  While privacy is of 
course closely related to data protection (and both are listed as fundamental 
rights under the EU’s Charter),39 the direct consequences of widely distributed 
dishonest comments about an opposing candidate are surely much more 
serious (and deserving of Article 8 protection) than an unwanted telephone 
call.  Finally, it should be noted that there may be room for further analysis 
under Article 3 of the First Protocol.  Although this is not the focus of this 
article, the regulation of political communication could also be seen as having 
an impact on the right to participate in the electoral process.  However, it is 
unlikely that, in the absence of a strong argument in term of Article 10, that 
any separate violation could be sustained; the limited record of Article 3. 
 
(b) Data protection law 
Although UK data protection law is almost entirely a creature of the relevant 
European Union instruments, and EU law itself subject to fundamental rights 
constraints, particular after the Lisbon Treaty changes and the planned 
accession to the ECHR as enabled by article 6 TEU, there is also scope for 
comparing national approaches to the relevant EU directives.  The law in 
neighbouring Ireland has taken a different path.  The relevant regulations 
transposing 2002/58, like their UK equivalents, rely on existing data protection 
                                                           
39 Although not yet tested, this point may yet be significant, not least because the autonomy 
of data protection as a right is pointed to by Murphy & Ó Cuinn as an example of the EU’s 
leading role in exploring new technologies and human rights: T Murphy & G Ó Cuinn, ‘Works 




definitions, but the Irish Data Protection Act explicitly excludes political direct 
mailing from its definition of direct marketing, excluding ‘direct mailing carried 
out in the course of political activities by a political party or its members … or 
a candidate for election to, or a holder of, elective political office’.  Although 
the reference to mailing is potentially ambiguous, it would certainly give 
political parties much greater confidence in the use of methods that 2002/58 
would appear to prevent non-political marketers from using.  It does of course 
still exclude political activities by non-partisan organisations; remember that 
many laws on television advertising do not distinguish between party and non-
party advertising.  As this provision was inserted as part of the package 
implementing the 2002 directive, we can wonder if it is meant to have a 
broader technological meaning.  Indeed, the Irish Data Protection 
Commissioner did investigate political marketing in the brief period between 
the entry into force of the new regulations and the statutory change in 
question, but described the change permitting direct mailing – perhaps 
through gritted teeth - as bringing ‘necessary clarity’ to the area.40  On the 
other hand, the Portuguese instrument of implementation specifically notes 
the inclusion of messages of a civil or political nature within the scope of 
provisions on marketing.41  In the UK, the position with relation to direct 
mailing is also affected by the language of the statute, which means that 
unaddressed mail (leaflets through a door, or indeed mail addressed to The 
Occupier) is not caught by the data protection legislation.42 
 
We can also note, in the context of a different Data Protection Directive 
dispute, the wide scope given to the exception for ‘journalistic purposes’ under 
article 9 of the Directive.  In Satakunnan Markkinapörssi,43 the question was 
whether the publication of data (albeit of taxation information already in the 
public domain) by a commercial service (using a range of technologies 
including SMS) could be covered by this exemption.  In an important passage, 
the ECJ held that, in this context, activities  
                                                           
40 ‘Case Study 4/02’  
41 Privacy International, Privacy and Human Rights 2006: Portugal (December 2007), 
available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/phr2006-republic-portugal  
42 ‘Guidance for political parties’ 5. 
43 C-73/07 
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may be classified as “journalistic activities” if their object is the 
disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of 
the medium which is used to transmit them. They are not limited to 
media undertakings and may be undertaken for profit-making 
purposes. 
Although there is no equivalent exemption in 2002/58, it is a useful correction 
to the idea that data protection affects all spheres of activity without 
distinction.  It is also an example of a content-based restriction on freedom of 
expression, in that speech falling outside the journalistic (or artistic or literary 
categories) is subject to greater restriction.44 However, the exact nature of the 
link between this specific exemption and vindication of the right to freedom of 
expression has not yet emerged, with Korff arguing that its limits themselves 
suggest inconsistency with article 10,45 and the Advocate General’s Opinion 
in this case suggested that there was some distance between the two.46  If it 
is possible to protect ‘the media’ or others from the impact of the 1995 
Directive (noting that some jurisdictions offer a generous interpretation of the 
exception),47 then is it so unreasonable to expect a parallel protection of 
political communication to potential voters under the 2002 Directive? 
 
Unsurprisingly, giving the high protection of political speech under the First 
Amendment tradition, the question of political marketing has been the subject 
of judicial and legislative attention in the United States.  In Van Bergen v 
Minnesota,48 a Minnesota prohibition on automatic telephone direct marketing 
of a type that UK political parties would easily recognize was found to be 
unconstitutional.  The Minnesota legislation was specifically amended after an 
earlier decision (which upheld existing legislation in so far as it affected 
commercial speech only) to clarify that ‘any call, regardless of its content’ 
would – if it used the technological approach in question – be prohibited.  The 
8th Circuit Court of Appeal rejected the contentions of the unhappy politician 
                                                           
44 Hare classifies this section along with exceptions to otherwise restrictive statutes, such as 
the artistic merit defence to an obscenity charge.  I Hare, ‘Method and objectivity in free 
speech adjudication: lessons from America’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 49, 79 fn 135. 
45 D Korff, Data protection law in the EU (Brussels: FEDMA, 2005) 24. 
46 As discussed in Vousden 528. 
47 Such as chapter 11 of loi 78-17 (as amended) in France as compared with s 32 of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 in the UK; see M Tugendhat & I Christie, The law of privacy and the 
media (Oxford: OUP, 2006) 155, 184. 
48 (1995) 59 F 3d 1541 (8th Circuit CA) 
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regarding content neutrality and the public forum doctrine, meaning that 
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny was the analytical approach in use. The 
court did, however, give detailed consideration to the restriction as a time, 
manner or place restriction on speech, and ultimately found that the 
government interest in ‘citizens’ residential privacy and business efficiency’ 
was substantial and dismissed the case.  On the other hand, the more recent 
federal legislation in the US that deals with the problem of ‘spam’49 contains a 
broad exemption for political messages, as it applies to emails with a primary 
purpose of ‘the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial 
product or service (including content on an Internet website operated for a 
commercial purpose),50 with the Federal Trade Commission adding 
(somewhat obviously) that the elaboration of the ‘primary purpose is not 
intended ‘to treat as a “commercial electronic mail message” anything that is 
not commercial speech.’51 While this may serve to underline the differences 
between US and Convention approaches to freedom of expression - a point 
made apparent in 2010 by the decision in Citizens United52 regarding the 
unconstitutionality of aspects of the 2002 campaign finance reforms - it does 
represent a firm definition of the line between commercial messages on one 
hand (conventionally, more susceptible to regulation) and high-value political 
expression on the other.  This is consistent with the views of opponents of 
protecting commercial expression such as Shiner, who argued that lifestyle 
advertising is not normally consistent with a ‘public good’ defence of (some) 
commercial expression as speech.53  In the case of political calls, though, this 
would be easier to argue, even in a situation where (as Shiner would favour) 
advertising is approached by human rights courts with some scepticism. 
 
4. Assessment  
One of the regular findings in challenges to political advertising restrictions is 
that there are alternative means of political communication available to 
political parties and other affected groups.  However, this means that the 
                                                           
49 15 USC 7701 (commonly known as the CAN-SPAM Act). 
50 15 USC 7702(2)(A) 
51 16 CFR 316.3 
52 (2010) 558 US 50 
53 R Shiner, Freedom of commercial expression (Oxford: OUP, 2003) ch 16. 
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basis (or part of the justification) for the upholding of one restriction can 
ultimately have an impact on the discussion of another restriction.  In the case 
of the techniques used by UK political parties, it can even be argued that the 
prohibition on contacting telephone subscribers without prior consent is an 
effective ban, as the very purpose of making contact will be - under normal 
electoral conditions - to communicate with those who are not already ‘known 
to’ the political party.  While it may be acceptable for a state to restrict some 
forms of political advertising, in terms of the protection of freedom of 
expression under article 10, there is a need to appreciate the overlapping 
impact of various bans, including not just those expressly targeted at political 
expression but also those that have an impact on political expression despite 
a more general purpose.  Even where restrictions exist, they may be balanced 
with effective ‘must carry’ provisions, such as the statutory regulation of party 
political broadcasts54 or provisions for electoral addresses to be delivered 
through the postal system without charge, subject to certain conditions.55   
 
We can also recall here the argument of Lord Bingham, who argued that the 
availability of other forms of communication is ‘of some weight’ when 
assessing the prohibition of political advertising about television and radio.56  
In particular, as the options for political advertising are already narrower than 
for non-political advertising, due to the broadcast restriction in the UK, any 
further restrictions on communication will have a different impact on the 
overall opportunities to speak available to the political speaker.  Animal 
Defenders is framed by Baroness Hale as a clash between freedom of 
expression and voter equality57 - an important point - but the basis for 
restricting direct political communications through telephone is surely a 
different one.   
 
                                                           
54 Communications Act 2003, s 333. 
55 Representation of the People Act 1983, s 91. 
56 Animal Defenders International [32]. 
57 Animal Defenders International [49].  See also Sackman’s discussion of the narrowness of 
the reasoning in this case and her alternative proposal for explaning and appreciating 
democracy as participatory: S Sackman, ‘Debating “democracy” and the ban on political 
advertising’ (2009) 72 MLR 475. 
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Valued concepts of Athenian democracy depend on a high value being placed 
on political communication but also the requirement for the citizen to receive 
messages or to listen, and to be interested in political affairs.  “We do not say 
that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own 
business; we say that he has no business here at all”.58  In the present day, it 
is clear that methods of political communication are undergoing significant 
change as a result of factors including media habits, changes in work 
patterns, the professionalisation of public relations through ‘spin’ and the 
sheer range of media messages in circulation. The existence of telephone 
calls regarding politics (particularly where there is some element of dialogue) 
can be argued to be part of a wider democratic environment for the discussion 
of political affairs. 
 
Party political or election broadcasts themselves are unpopular with some 
viewers,59 are limited to the established broadcast channels,60 which occupy a 
diminishing share of viewer attention, and are shorter in duration than ever 
before.61  Although some research indicates that calling to the doorstep 
remains a more effective way of communicating certain messages than direct 
mail or telephone messaging,62 times change, as do doorsteps in the modern 
city of gated apartment blocks.  Automated messages may indeed become an 
appropriate way to circulate political information as the traditional role of the 
established media and the historical dominance of the newspaper is 
challenged by new technologies – maybe one day being as unexceptional as 
party election broadcasts or election addresses sent through the mail, or even 
the subject of mandatory or must carry rules.  This is not to say that they 
should become routine without further consideration - but that the matter 
                                                           
58 Attributed to Pericles (495-429 BC); reproduced in D Held, Models of Democracy (3rd edn) 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2006) 14. 
59 M Scammell & A Langer, ‘Political advertising: why is it so boring?’ (2006) 28 Media Culture 
& Society 763, 765 
60 M Scammell & A Langer, ‘Political advertising in the United Kingdom’ in L Kaid & C Holtz-
Bacha, The SAGE Handbook of Political Advertising (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006) 67, 
72. 
61 Scammell & Langer, ‘Political advertising: why is it so boring?’ 769; K Rafter, Political 
advertising: the regulatory position and the public view (Dublin: Broadcasting Authority of 
Ireland, 2009) 10. 
62 A Gerber & D Green, 'The effects of canvassing, telephone calls, and direct mail on voter 
turnout: a field experiment' (2000) 94 American Political Science Review 653. 
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should be debated in a more thorough fashion.  Despite the justified criticism 
of the disregard for well-publicised legal restrictions by political parties who 
should know better, restrictions on political communication of this nature and 
their impact on the democratic culture fostered by article 10 deserve greater 
scrutiny than they have received to date. 
